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COMMENTS
PENNSYLVANIA LIMITED ACCESS HIGHWAY LAW
Sinte motor vehicle traffic in the United States has increased enormously
in the last two decades, highway congestion and accidents have become continually more burdensome. Analysis of statistical computations indicates that
control of access to highways offers a significant method by which these probAccordingly, various states including Pennsylvania
lems can be alleviated.
have enacted legislation authorizing the establishment of limited access highways. The Pennsylvania Limited Access Highway Law 2 has recently been
declared unconstitutional, by a Federal District Court in Creasy v. Stevens,
160 F. Supp. 404 (1958).
The particular section of the Act disputed reads:
"For the purpose of constructinglimited highways, local service highways, s
or intersection streets or roads, the Secretary of Highways is hereby empowered
to take property and pay damages therefor as herein provided.

.

. .

The

owner or owners of private property affected by the construction or designation
of a limited access highway or local service highway or by a change of the
width or lines of any intersecting streets or roads shall be entitled only to
damages from an actual taking of property. The Commonwealth shall not be
liable for consequential damages where no property is taken." 4 (emphasis

added.)
The Act was initially challenged in the United States District Court,
Western District of Pennsylvania, by owners and occupants of property abutting
on a free access highway under control of Allegheny County which was to
be designated a limited access highway by the Commonwealth. The plain1 Accident Experience on Controlled Access Highways, Circular Memorandum to Division
Engineers from the Acting Deputy Commissioner, Department of Commerce, Bureau of Public
Roads, April 25, 1955; National Research Council, Highway Research Board, Expressway Law 8
(1957).
Act of
2 Act of May 29, 1945, P.L. 1108, as amended, Act of June 10, 1947, P.L. 481, § 1.
May 31, 1957, P. L. 234, No. 111, § 1; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, §§ 2391.1-2391.15. Section one of
the Act of 1945 defines a limited access highway as a "public highway to which owners or occupants of abutting property or the traveling public have no right of ingress or egress to, from or
across such highway, except as may be provided by the authorities responsible therefor."
3 "A local service highway is defined as a public highway, either existing or new, or combination thereof, parallel or approximately parallel to the limited access highway which will provide
ingress or egress to or from highways or areas which would otherwise be isolated by the construction or establishment of a limited access highway." Act of May 29, 1945, P.L. 1108, § 1; PA.
STAT.4 ANN. tit. 36, § 2391.1.
Act of May 29, 1945, P.L. 1108, § 8, as amended, Act of June 10, 1947, P.L. 481, § 1; PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 36,

§

2391.8.
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tiffs sought to permanently enjoin the State from designating the highway as
one of limited access on the ground that to do so would be violative of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The District
Court, reluctant to resolve the constitutional issue before the courts of the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania construed the statute, granted a temporary
injunction and stayed the proceedings pending outcome of litigation in the
state courts.
Accordingly, the plaintiffs initiated identical action in the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County, Pennsylvania.' This court, on preliminary
objections by defendants, dismissed the plaintiffs' action, holding that under
Section 8 of the statute they were afforded an adequate remedy at law to
test their right to damages, if any, before a board of viewers. The court,
thus, side-stepped the pivotal issue of whether the plaintiffs were entitled to
damages under that section and decided the matter on a purely procedural
point. The plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania and the
decision was affirmed per curiam.6
Subsequently, the plaintiffs returned to the District Court and filed a
motion for a permanent injunction to prevent the defendants from enforcing
the statute. On the same day, defendants moved to dissolve the temporary
injunction and dismiss the complaint. The Court assumed jurisdiction stating:
1. ..were we to refuse to exercise our jurisdiction, the plaintiffs would
suffer substantial financial losses during the time it would take to litigate the
constitutionality of the statute in the State Courts, which losses could never be
recouped if the statute were eventually declared to be unconstitutional. In that
event the plaintiffs would be irreparably harmed." 7
As authority the court cited Too mer v. Witsell,8 a comparable case involving a state statute which required a license for trawling in South Carolina
waters. Trawling without the license subjected the plaintiffs to criminal
penalties. If they did pay the substantial licensing fee, however, there was no
provision by which they could later recover the amount paid. Section 9 of
the Pennsylvania Act presently under consideration provides for imposition of
a fine or imprisonment for violation of traffic control established for a limited
access highway. The two situations are analogous.
Having assumed jurisdiction, the Court proceeded to discuss the merits
of the case. The plaintiffs contended that if the highway is declared a limited
5 Creasy v. Lawler,
tary of Highways.
6 Creasy v. Lawler,
7 Creasy v. Stevens,
8 73 F. Supp. 371,

8 D. & C. 2d 535 (1956); Defendant Stevens succeeded Lawler as Secre389 Pa. 635, 133 A.2d 178 (1957).
160 F. Supp. at 409 (1958).
334 U.S. 385 (1948).
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access highway by authority of the statute the resultant total destruction of
their right of access would constitute a "taking" under eminent domain and,
consequently, impose a duty upon the Commonwealth to pay them compensation. The defendants, on the other hand, contended that the statute was
only proper exercise of police power and even though the property rights
of the plaintiffs were destroyed by action under the statute there would be
no duty on the Commonwealth under the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution of the United States to pay them compensation.
The District Court did not consider the complete deprivation by law of
the right of access as being within the principle of "damnum absque injuria,"
but rather concluded that deprivation of the plaintiffs' access to the highway
would constitute a "taking" of property in the constitutional sense. This
could be done under the Commonwealth's power of eminent domain and
the plaintiffs would be entitled to compensation. Further, examining the
statute in light of previous pertinent decisions of the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court, the Court determined that the Pennsylvania Legislature did not intend
to compensate abutting landowners whose right of access would be destroyed
but whose land would not actually be taken. The statute was found repugnant
to the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution
of the United States and the defendants were permanently enjoined from enforcing it over the plaintiffs' protest.'
The development of the law in Pennsylvania has followed a relatively
normal pattern in the general area of eminent domain and police power. It
is the law in Pennsylvania, as elsewhere, that private property shall not be
taken without just compensation first being made or secured.1" Additionally,
the Courts of the Commonwealth have gone even further and established
that there need not be an actual physical seizure to constitute a "taking." "'
However, the universally accepted rule is that private property may be regulated
by police power to a certain extent without a "taking" occurring which gives
rise to compensatory remuneration. This rule itself is limited, however, in
that if the regulation goes too far it also will be declared a "taking" and the
9 Other issues raised, such as the "Six Per Cent Rule," are not within the scope of this
comment.
10 PA. CONST., art. IX, § 1.
Here the court held
11 Gardner v. Allegheny County, 382 Pa. 88, 114 A.2d 491 (1955).
that flights of aircraft which are so low and so frequent as to be a direct and immediate interference with the use and enjoyment of the land would amount to a "taking" of the land; see also,
A city ordinance denying comMiller v. City of Beaver Falls, 368 Pa. 189, 82 A.2d 34 (1951).
pensation for improvements on land subsequent to its being included in any planned park or parkway coupled with the city council's adoption of such a plan held to constitute a "taking" even though
physical seizure had not been made.
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Pennsylvania is in line with

The Creasy case raised no problem as to whether access is a property
right. The great weight of authority in the United States is that an abutting
property owner's right of access to an existent public street or highway is
a property right. The majority also maintain that this right cannot be "taken"
without compensation being paid." The Supreme Court of the United States
has adopted this view in saying:
"The General Doctrine is correctly stated in Dillon on Municipal Corporations: 'For example, an abutting owner's right of access to and from the street,
subject only to legitimate public regulation, is as much his property as his right
to the soil within his boundary lines ....

When he is deprived of such right

of access, or of any other easement connected with the use and enjoyment of
his property, other than by legitimate public regulation, he is deprived of his
property.' " 14
It must be noted that the above refers only to toal deprivation. It does
not preclude limitation of location, size or number of accesses without payment for limitations so imposed. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania recognized this right to control without payment of compensation in the case
of Farmers-Kessinger Market House Co. v. Reading.5 There the city
prohibited an abutting property owner from constructing a driveway over a
sidewalk in order to gain access to one of the city's main thoroughfares. The
Court held that there was not a compensable "taking" but only a legitimate
regulation through exercise of police power because the property owner had
access to a parallel street on the other end of his property. The Court did
recognize, however, that, "If the City of Reading were attempting to deny
plaintiff's property all vehicular ingress and egress, the reasonableness of its
act might be justly questioned ..... ,,..
While Pennsylvania recognizes access as a property right, it has adopted
a unique approach as to the manner of treating it. The Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania has held that where there have been damages in cases of highway
improvement, there must have been an actual "taking" of the complaining
property owner's land before the Commonwealth can be made to answer.17
12 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922); Delaware, L. & W. R. R. v. Town
of Morristown, 276 U.S. 182 (1928).
12For a collection of cases, see 18 AM. JUR., Eminent Domain, §§ 183-5 (1938); 29 C.J.S.,

Eminent
Domain, § 105 (1941).
4

1 Donovan v. Pennsylvania Co., 199 U.S. 279, 302 (1905).
1 310 Pa. 493, 165 At. 398 (1933).
16 Id. at 501-502, 165 At. at 402.
17 Koontz v. Commonwealth, 364 Pa. 145, 70 A.2d 308 (1950); see also State Highway Law
of Pennsylvania, Act of June 1, 1945, P.L. 1242, art. I1, § 304.
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When access rights have been destroyed without- land actually having been
"taken", the losses are referred to as "consequential damages" for which the
Commonwealth is generally not responsible. In short, Pennsylvania recognizes
this right but where the Commonwealth causes its deprivation, remedy generally can only be had if there is a connected "taking" of land. Where, therefore, an abutting property owner's right of access to an existent public way
happens to be cut off by the Commonwealth he is likely to find himself with
no remedy whatsoever.
A retrospective glance should serve to clarify this peculiar area of Pennsylvania law. Prior to 1874 governmental immunity to suit precluded any recovery for "consequential damage" inflicted by governmental agencies." That
year, however, the present constitution of the Commonwealth was adopted and
in one section provided:
"Municipal and other corporations and individuals invested with the

privilege of taking private property for public use shall make just compensation for property taken, injured or destroyed by the construction or enlargement
of their works, highways, or improvements, which compensation shall be paid
or secured before such taking, injury or destruction. .. " 19 (emphasis added)

The courts of Pennsylvania have construed this section as imposing
liability for "consequential damages" upon the agency responsible therefor.
It has been consistently held, however, that this section is inapplicable to the
Commonwealth itself, on the ground that the Commonwealth has not been
specifically included therein."0
Application of this view is illustrated by McGarrity v. Commonwealth."
In constructing a bridge across the Delaware River it was necessary for the
Commonwealth to change the grade of a street running in front of the property leased by the plaintiff's decedent. The new level of the street was six feet
below its former gradient and completely denied vehicular access from the
property concerned in the suit. The lessee occupying the premises was engaged
in a business necessitating the use of trucks and, this street having been his
only means of access to the property, was forced to vacate his leaselhold and
remove his heavy machinery therefrom. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
affirmed the judgment of the lower court holding that such damage was
merely "consequential" and as such did not constitute a "taking" of property
18 Struthers v. Dunkirk, etc., Ry. Co., 87 Pa. 282 (1878).
The basis for this action occurred
in 1871.
19
2 0 PA. CONST., art. XVI, § 8.
In re State Highway Route, No. 72, 265 Pa. 369, 108 Atd. 820 (1919); Moyer v. Commonwealth, 183 Pa. Super. 333, 132 A.2d 902 (1957); Brewer v. Commonwealth, 345 Pa. 144, 27
A.2d 53 (1942).
21 311 Pa. 436, 166 Atl. 42 (1933).
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under the Pennsylvania Constitution."
The Supreme Court also stated in
this case that compensation for such damages was a matter of legislative grace
and not of right.
In another and quite similar case the Commonwealth constructed a bridge
on an existing street, running generally in an east-west direction. The structure was twenty feet inside the southern line of the street, but resulted in
raising the grade line so that access to the complaining property owner's land,
situated on the southern side, was impaired. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in disallowing compensation stated that no part of the owner's property as such had been taken by the change of grade which was entirely within
the street right-of-way, and that any damage to access, light, or air resulting
from change of grade was indirect. The Court went on to say, however, that
the city or the county in which the bridge was constructed would have been
liable had they undertaken the same project."
While the Commonwealth has not been held responsible for "consequential
damages," municipal corporations do not enjoy this immunity. In Walsh v.
Scranton 24 the city of Scranton, in the course of improving a street, had built
a retaining wall which cut off access to a connecting street. As a result the
plaintiff's property, abutting on the connecting street, was left in a cul de
sac. The court held this to be a compensable injury saying:
"The owner of property which has been depreciated in value by reason
of the destruction of the means of access thereto, in the making of a public improvement, sustains an injury in his property rights which is peculiar to himself,
and which is different in kind from the injury sustained by those who use the
street for travel only; for the impairment of the special right of ingress and
egress he is entitled to compensation." 25

-

In another case not involving the Commonwealth, the Superior Court
of Pennsylvania said, "That a man's right of access to his property is a valuable
right which cannot be taken away without just compensation has been repeatedly recognized." 21
Even under that interpretation excluding the Commonwealth from application of the constitutional provision imposing liability the Commonwealth
may be held responsible for "consequential damages", if the act granting
22 PA.

CONST., art I,

§ 10.

23Soldiers and Sailors Memorial Bridge, 308 Pa. 487, 162 At. 309 (1932);

see also Brewer
v. Commonwealth, 345 Pa. 144, 27 A.2d 53 (1942).
2423 Pa. Super. 276 (1903).
25 Id. at 278.
20 Lang v. Smith, 113 Pa. Super. 555, 173 At. 827 (1934); see also, Breinig v. Allegheny
County, 332 Pa. 474, 2 A.2d 842 (1938); Farmers-Kessinger Market House Co. v. Reading, 410
Pa. 493, 165 Atd. 398 (1933).
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authority to undertake the project concerned expressly provides for compensation for "consequential damages" in cases where property is not actually taken."7
In a case in which a limited access highway, The Pennsylvania Turnpike,
was constructed and large cuts and fills were left exposed with the result that
through erosion large quantities of dirt, stones, and debris were washed into
a creek and carried into plaintiff's lake, killing his fish, and filling the lake
with sludge, the Commonwealth was held responsible and made to compensate the property owner for the "consequential damage." 2" The Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania held the Turnpike Commission, an agency of the Commonwealth, liable on the basis that the governmental immunity of the Commonwealth was not applicable in that particular case because the enabling
act specifically provided for payment of such damages."
There is a severe limitation on this exception and that is that clear and
sufficient "warning" must be indicated in the title of the act under which the
Commonwealth is to be held responsible for "consequential damages." " This
is not to say that the title must be a complete index or synopsis of the contents.
The Pennsylvania courts treat an award of "consequential damages" by -the
Commonwealth as a boon to the fortunate granted by the Legislature rather
than the right of all."
It is noteworthy that in passing the Limited Access Highway Law the
General Assembly apparently recognized the foregoing injustice. In the latter
part of Section 8 appears the following:
"Provided, however, that the Secretary of Highways shall have authority
to enter into agreements for the sharing of the cost of property damages with
the officials of any political subdivision of the Commonwealth, which assumes
such responsibility by proper resolution or ordinance. The taking of private
property and the payment of damage therefor by the authorities of any political
subdivision of the Commonwealth shall be in the same manner as now or hereafter provided by law for the relocation or widening of highways by the political
subdivision in which such highway is located." 32
It is clear that political subdivisions may quite properly assume responsibility for "consequential damages." " Apparently the Secretary of High27 Heil v. Allegheny County, 330 Pa. 449, 199 Atl. 341 (1938).
28

Ewalt v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission, 382 Pa. 529, 115 A.2d 729 (1955).

29 Western Pennsylvania Turnpike Extension Act, Act of June 11, 1941, P.L. 101, § 6 (k).
20 PA. CONST., art. III, § 3.

31 Soldiers and Sailors Memorial Bridge, 308 Pa. 487, 162 At. 309 (1932); In re State Highway Route No. 72, 265 Pa. 369, 108 At. 820 (1919); Hoffetr v. Reading Co., 287 Pa. 120, 134
At. 415 (1926); McGarrity v. Commonwealth, 311 Pa. 436, 166 Atl. 895 (1933).
2Act of May 29, 1945, P.L. 1108, § 8, as amended, Act of June 10, 1947, P.L. 481, § 1;
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 2391.8.
38 PA. CoNST., art XVI, § 8 (1874).
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ways may enter into agreements subjecting the Commonwealth to liability for
"consequential damages", but note that the Secretary is not required to enter
any agreements.
The problem presented by the Limited Access Highway Law will arise
only where a presently existing highway is designated a limited access highway
and no land is actually taken. Where a new way is built or the old one relocated or widened, there is necessarily a "taking" which is compensable.
Under the present system of measuring damages in eminent domain proceedings in Pennsylvania, subtraction of the "after-value" from the "before-value"
with difference equaling the damage, it becomes irrelevant whether or not
the way is to be of limited access since that factor can be considered in the
determination of the "after-value." 34
Since the Pennsylvania Courts recognize that an actual seizure is unnecessary to constitute a "taking," and also that an abutting property owner's right
of access is itself a property right it would seem only logical for them to recognize deprivation of that right as a "taking" and not to consider it a "consequential damage." As Mr. Justice Maxey, vigorously dissenting in McGarrity
v.Commonwealth, pointed out, ". . It is said that a landowner is not entitled to compensation where the damage is merely 'consequential.' The use
of the term, 'consequential damage,' 'prolongs the dispute' and 'introduces an
equivocation which is fatal to any hope of a clear settlement.' " "
Because the Limited Access Highway Law of Pennsylvania does not
specifically provide for payment of "consequential damages," it can be fairly
assumed that the intent of the Legislature is that none shall be paid thereunder. Counsel for the Commonwealth has so contended in Creasy v. Stevens.
It seems obvious that the deprivations which would result from enforcement
of the Act would be uncompensated "takings" violative of the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Another objectionable feature of the Act is the "compromise" proviso
in the latter part of Section 8. This, it can be readily observed, could lead
to arbitrary and discriminatory awards being made. Political patronage could
become one if not the most important factor in deciding who is to be compensated.
84 State Highway Law of Pennsylvania, Act of June 1, 1945, P.L. 1242, art, III, § 303; PA.

tit. 36, § 670-303. This was apparently the case in Creasy v. Stevens; see statement
of the court, 160 F. Supp. at page 408.
35 311 Pa. at 452-453, 166 Atl. at 901 (1933)
quoting Eaton v. Boston, Concord, and Montreal
R.R., 51 N.H. 504, 12 Am. Rep. 147 (1872).
STAT. ANN.
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Creasy v. Stevens is, at the time of this writing, on appeal to the Supreme
Court of the United States and it remains to be seen whether or not Pennsylvania will find it necessary to re-legislate in the area concerning limited
access highways. The expedient method of doing this would be to specifically
provide in each enactment, for payment of "consequential damages". This,
however, can lead to "spotty coverage" and result in litigation like that in
Creasy v. Stevens. Further, it seems unlikely that Pennsylvania Courts will
quickly change the distinction they presently make between "taking" and "consequential damages." It is suggested that the most permanent remedy would
be amendment of the Pennsylvania Constitution placing liability on the Commonwealth for "consequential damages." In view of the growing trend toward
limited access highways and the ever increasing value placed on property, this
area of the law demands consideration.
THOMAS A. BECKLEY.
36 For other writings on limited access highway law, see 3 STAN. L. REV. 298 (1951); 43 IOWA
L. REV. 258 (1958); 33 ORE.L. REV. 16 (1953); 4 MD. L. REV. 219 (1940); 27 WASH.L. REV. 111

(1952).

